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Introduction
During the late eighties questions have arisen about the quality of supplied water in
France.  The main observable implication of this is a dramatic increase in the
consumption of bottled water during the eighties.  This suggests that the French
consumers only consider the decrease in the true or presumed quality of tap water when
it is used as a beverage.  This also reveals that consumers may incur significant costs
due to supplied water pollution, the cost of drinking tap water being negligible when
compared to the cost of bottled water consumption.
In this paper, we propose and implement a method to infer the value of the quality of
supplied water when it is used as a beverage. The lack of data we have to face and the
nature of the problem we have to deal with preclude direct use of standard methods of
environmental goods valuation. Hence, we develop a method that is indirect and that
only requires usually available data: purchases and prices of marketed soft drinks for
households supplied with variable but identifiable qualities of tap water.
The first section briefly presents our theoretical framework.  It is based on two
distinct but closely related domains of consumer's economics: public good indirect
valuation and measurement of equivalence scales. The second section presents the data
set we used to estimate the value of the quality of tap water for the French young
households.  The third section presents the empirical model and the fourth section
presents the results and their interpretation.
Theoretical framework
Consider a consumer who can consume K+1 market goods.  The consumed quantities of
the goods are denoted by the vector (x0, x) where good 0 is tap water used as a beverage.
The consumer is supplied with water of quality q.  The consumers' utility function is2
denoted by U(.).  It is defined over (x0, x, q), meaning that the consumer has preferences
over the market goods as well as over the quality of tap water.  The prices of the goods
are denoted by the vector (p0, p).  For an available income y, the consumer's program is
defined as:
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Let  V(.), respectively  C(.), denote the indirect utility function, respectively the
expenditure function, associated with U(.).  A relevant measure of the consumer's value
of an increase in q from q
0 to q
1 is provided by the compensating variation in income
S(.):
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0 q y p V U p ” .  It corresponds to her willingness to pay for an increase in
q, her welfare level being held constant at its initial level U
0.
The indirect methods for evaluating  S(.) rely on some maintained assumptions
related to the relationships that exist between q and the observed demands for market
goods (Freeman, 1993).  Formally, these methods first require to estimate the
Marshallian demands  ) , , , ( 0 q y p mk p  (k = 0,1,…,K) while explicitly taking into account
their variations in q.  The estimation of  ) , , , , (
1 0 0
0 q q U p S p  then requires to integrate
back the expenditure function  ) , , , (
1 0
0 q U p C p  or, equivalently, the indirect utility
function  ) , , , (
1
0 q y p V p .  Doing this, one faces a serious identification problem
(Blundell and Lewbel, 1991; Ebert, 1998).  The Marshallian demand functions
) , , , ( 0 q y p mk p  completely reveal the consumers' preferences over (x0,x) given q, i.e.
conditional preferences.  However, knowledge on the consumers' preference over
(x0,x,q), i.e. unconditional preferences, is necessary to integrate  ) , , , (
1 0
0 q U p C p  or3
) , , , (
1
0 q y p V p .  This follows from the fact that  ) , , , (
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increasing transformation that may dependent on q.
Many of standard methods of public good valuation use a result presented by
Blundell and Lewbel (1991).  This result can be exposed as follows:  If there exits a
known price regime  ) , ( 0
c c p p  such that  ) , , , , (
1 0 0
0 q q U p S
c c p  is known, then the
Marshallian demand functions  ) (.,
0 q mk  and  ) (.,
1 q mk  (k = 0,1,…,K) can be used to
uniquely recover the true values of  ) , , (.,
1 0 0 q q U S  in any other price regime.
In order to apply this result, two main conditions must hold: a price regime  ) , ( 0
c c p p
such that  ) , , , , (
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c c p  is known must be known and this price regime must be
identifiable.  The focus here is the use value of q as an attribute of tap water used as a
beverage.  In this context two assumptions appear reasonable: tap water consumption
increases in q; and q doesn't matter to a consumer not drinking tap water. Formally this
can be written as:
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The Hicksian tap water demand function h0(.) being decreasing in p0, one may find an
identifying price regime  ) , ( 0 p
c p  may be found by simply increasing p0 up to the point
where tap water is not consumed anymore.  In this case, tap water and tap water quality
are weak complement in Mäler's (1974) sense.  However, this result cannot be
empirically applied, at least directly, since the drunk tap water quantities are not
measured in our data set, as it is usually the case.  Thus, it can reasonably be assumed4
that there exist a price regime where the consumer's willingness to pay is known, but
this price regime is not identifiable with our data without further information or
assumptions.
The averting expenditure approach (Courant and Porter, 1981) assumes that
consumers purchase goods in order to avoid or mitigate the negative effects of q (See,
e.g., Abdalla et al, 1992 and Rosado, 1998). In our case, the consumers actually face a
trade-off: either consuming almost free supplied water despite its bad flavour and health
risk, or purchasing expensive but safe beverages on the market.  Considering that
bottled water is the closest substitute for tap water and that tap water costs are
negligible, one can reasonably assume that:
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where good 1 is bottled water. According to assumption (3g), one may find an
identifying price regime  ) , ( 0
c p p  by simply decreasing p1 down to the point where tap
water is not consumed anymore.  It can be expected that  0 1 p p
c >  since it can be
considered that the quality of bottled water is always better than the quality of tap water
due to its mineral content, its flavour or its image.  In this case bottled water and tap
water quality are weak substitutes in Feenberg and Mills' (1980) sense. Thus, as5
previously, one can reasonably assume that there exists a price regime where the
consumer's willingness to pay is known.  Assumptions (3e)-(3g) ensure that this price
regime is identifiable with our data.  They ensure that the Hicksian demand of good k
conditional on q
1 is equal to the Hicksian of good k conditional on q
0 for any k=1,..,K in
a price regime if and only if tap water of quality q
1 or q
0 is not drunk in that price
regime:
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Condition (4b) can be empirically used to recover 
c p1  since it only concerns observed
market (Marshallian) demands.
Data
The data that we used consists in six  Food Consumption Surveys, one every second
year from 1981 to 1991 conducted by INSEE (National Institute for Studies on
Economics and Statistics). Each survey provides a random sample of 8000 households
of the French population. In addition to standard demographic and economic
characteristics, these surveys provide specific data on food consumption at a detailed
level. We decided to keep only households whose heads are less than 55 years old
because older people may have a specific bottled consumption due to health
considerations and medical advice.6
Having no relevant measure of tap water quality over the studied period, we defined
two areas in France according to our priors on the quality of their supplied water, to
geological and topological arguments as well as to the bottled water consumption means
per département.
We first defined a mountain (M) area, including the main mountains of France. Since
supplied water in this area directly comes from preserved springs, tap water quality can
be presumed as very good and constant over the considered period.  The average
consumption of bottled water of households in this area is low, despite a slight increase
in 1991 (1.3 litre/week/household in 1981 and 2.9 litre/week/household in 1991).  We
then defined a plain (P) area.  This area is characterised by a high population density.  It
concentrates a large part of the French industries. It is one of the most fertile area in
France where intensive agriculture is common practice since the early sixties.  Tap
water quality is low at the beginning of the considered period.  It might have declined in
consumers' minds since.  The bottled water mean consumption of households in this
area is high during the period (2.5 litre/week/household in 1981 and 4.5
litre/week/household in 1991).  The average consumption of elaborated soft drinks is
also higher in this area than it is in the mountain area  (1.4 litre/week/household in the
mountain area against 1.9 litre/week/household in the plain area in 1991).  This suggests
that bottled water may not be the only substitute for tap water.
In the remaining of the paper, we present the empirical application of our theoretical
background with the INSEE data.  Specifically our objective is to measure the
willingness to pay of households living in the plain area to benefit from the quality of
the water supplied in the mountain area.
Empirical implementation7
Empirical model
For convenience, it is now assumed that soft drinks form a separable group of goods
according to consumers' preferences.  Thus U(.) now designs the partial utility of soft
drinks,  y designs the consumer's soft drink expenditure (where tap water cost is
negligible) and the demands of only two market goods are considered (K=2): bottled
water and elaborated soft drinks (juices, sodas, etc.).  This separability assumption is
standard in applied consumption analyses.  It is mainly imposed to save degrees of
freedom and due to lack of data, but it implies that only partial welfare measures can be
recovered.  In this context, Hanemann and Morey (1992) showed that the consumer's
willingness to pay for an increase in q, when her partial welfare level is held constant at
its initial level is always inferior to her willingness to pay for the same increase in q,
when her global welfare level is held constant at its initial level.  This is because an
individual will pay less to bring about an improvement if he is constrained in his ability
to take advantage of that improvement, i.e. to change her soft drink utility level in our
case.
We assume here that the preferences over soft drinks the considered consumer can be
represented by a PIGLOG expenditure function:
(5) ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , , , ( ln 0 q B q u I q A u q p C p p p + ” .
According to assumption (4d), p0 does not appear in the right hand side term of (5).
Note, however, that q may influence the cost of reaching utility u through functions
A(.), B(.) and I(.).  Function I(.) is increasing in its first argument and is introduced to
recall that and indirect utility function is known only up to an increasing function that
may depend on q.  The flexible "Almost Ideal" (AI) forms of Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980a) were chosen as parametric forms for A(.) and B(.):8
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All parameters of (6) can be estimated from price and consumption data for goods 1 and
2.  Thus the identification problem of (6) is only associated to I(.,q).  The I(u,q) values
cannot directly be compared for different q's.
If 
c p1  is the price under which tap water consumption is choked off and
) , ( 2 1 p p
c c = p , we have:
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Note that  p
c identifies  S(.) since both expressions (8a) and (8b) only depend on
empirically estimable parameters or known variables.
Using conditions (4), one can recover 
c p1  as the highest value for p1 (below its actual
level) satisfying the following equation:
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The first left hand side term of (10a) is the Hicksian share of bottled water in soft drink
expenditures in the price regime p
c:  ) , , (
0 0 q U s
c p .  According to (4), the left hand side
term of (9a) is positive for prices of bottled water superior to 
c p1 .  Consumers supplied
with low quality tap water purchase more bottled water than consumers supplied with
high quality tap water.
Econometric model and estimation procedure
In the Food Consumption Surveys, households are surveyed during only one week.
Thus, at the individual household level, relevant econometric models would need to
take into account infrequency of purchase, corner solutions and truncation features.  A
way to avoid these problems is to work with data aggregated over households. We used
a simple aggregation procedure.  Thanks to the large number of surveyed households,
we defined 7 cohorts of six-years age band and aggregated the households of these
cohorts as "representative aggregated households" in each survey. The bottled water
budget share (w) of a "representative household" at time  t is the share of the total
expenditure on bottled water in the total expenditure of soft drink of the considered
cohort at time  t.   The total expenditure on soft drinks (y) of an "aggregated
representative households" is deflated by the number of represented households.  The
price variables are the standard prices indices computed at the country level by INSEE.
Having no indicator of the quality of tap water during the studied period, we
estimated a demand function for bottled water for each of the two defined area.
Formally, we estimated budget shares of bottled water of the form:10
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Sub-index t indicates time (t = 81,…,91), c indicates cohort (c = 1,…,7) and r indicates
area (r = m,p).  The natural logarithm of the "representative household" average age
(lnact) is introduced in the parameter  1 a  to take into account the positive effect of age
on budget share of bottled water. Our structural change tests led us to accept the
hypotheses of no structural change for both areas.  This would indicate that soft drink
demands were not affected by structural changes or were affected similarly by some
unknown factors.
It is well-known that with a limited price variation, the practical identification of  r 10 a
and  r 0 a  is problematical.  The usual solution is to impose constraints on either  r 10 a  or
r 0 a .  (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a).  Here we chose to impose a constraint on  r 0 a .
This parameter can be interpreted as the natural logarithm of the minimal outlay
required for a minimal standard of living ( 0 ) , ( = q u I ) when prices indices are unity
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a).  Here we impose the condition that if the price of
bottled water is equal to 15% of its actual level, then the minimal outlay (deflated by p2)
is equal to about 20% of the minimal observed outlay (deflated by p2). Different tries
showed that our results are not sensitive with respect to these constraints. Estimates then
showed that the hypotheses that the parameters  r 10 a  and  r 11 a  are equal for both areas
could be accepted.  They were imposed to increase estimation efficiency and to save
degrees of freedom.11
We used the two stage non-linear least squares estimator to account for the
endogeneity of the soft drink expenditure variable (y).  The average total income of the
cohort was used as an instrumental variable in addition to the price and age variables
(and their combinations in w) that can be assumed exogenous.  The error terms erct are
assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
Results
The estimated elasticities of the demands of soft drinks are presented in Table 1.  They
show that bottled water, the closest substitute for tap water, has a more rigid demand in
the plain area. This could be interpreted as reflecting the fact that tap water is less
consumed in the plain area than in the mountain area.
Table 1. Means of different elasticities of the bottled water demand in the two considered areas
Mountain area Plain area
Mean of the elasticities of the bottled water demand
with respect to:
Soft drink expenditure elasticity 0.93 0.75
Marshallian own price elasticity -0.75 -0.52
Hicksian own price elasticity -0.36 -0.17
Before 1988, a cut in the price of bottled water ranging from 59% to 72% is needed
to choke off the Hicksian demand of tap water while a price cut ranging from 41% to
45% is sufficient after 1988.  This may be explained by the decrease in the value added
tax of soft drinks from 18.6% to 5.5% decided by the French government in 1989.
The estimated willingness to pay of households living in the plain area to benefit
from the quality of the water supplied in the mountain is almost null during the whole
period.  This means that households living in the mountain area would have to spend the
same amount in soft drink purchases to reach the actual soft drink utility level of similar
households living in the plain area.  Households living in the plain area spend on soft12
drinks about twice as much as households living in the mountain area.  Together with
our almost null willingness to pay for an increase in tap water quality this indicates that
the actual soft drink utility level of households living in the plain area is higher than the
actual soft drink utility level of similar households living in the  mountain area.  In fact,
it seems that households living in the plain area are led to purchase bottled water, a
good that is considered as almost a luxury in the mountain area, because they want to
drink less tap water of low quality.  This may explain why they reach a higher partial
utility level.  People living in the plain area would also find that bottled water is a
luxury if they were supplied with high quality tap water.  Purchasing bottled water they
purchase safe water, minerals, diet properties, bottles, an advertised image, etc while
many of them would like to only purchase safe water.
Concluding comments
Our approach uses concepts developed in two apparently distinct literatures:
environmental good valuation and equivalent scale measurement. Our application with
French data proves that its tractability, in the sense that it only uses usually available
data and in the sense it gives rather intuitive results while relying on reasonable
assumptions.
Our results provide an argument in favour of Hanemann and Morey's (1992)
pessimistic view concerning the usefulness of partial welfare measurement.  They show
that the lower bound of households' willingness to pay for an increase in tap water
quality is close to zero.
However, our results must be interpreted with caution, as we had to estimate simple
demand functions as well as to use aggregated data due to data constraints.13
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